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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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4	Landworks Creations, LLC,)
5	Plaintiff,)
6	vs.) Case No. 05cv40072-FDS
7))
8	United States Fidelity and) Guaranty Company,) Defendant.)
9	Defendant.)
10	BEFORE: The Honorable F. Dennis Saylor, IV
11	BEFORE THE HOHOTOBEET. BEHILD BUYTOT, IV
12	Pretrial Conference
13	rreerrar commence
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15	United States District Court
16	Courtroom No. 2 595 Main Street
17	Worcester, Massachusetts April 29, 2008
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22	Marianne Kusa-Ryll, RDR, CRR
23	Official Court Reporter United States District Court
24	595 Main Street, Room 514A Worcester, MA 01608-2093
25	508-929-3399 Mechanical Steno - Transcript by Computer

Case 4:05-cv-40072-FDS Document 109 Filed 05/07/2008-APPEARANCES: Robert N. Meltzer, Esquire P.O. Box 1459 Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 for the Plaintiff Hermes, Netburn, O'Connor & Spearing by Peter G. Hermes, Esquire 265 Franklin Street 7th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02110 for the Defendant United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: All rise.

4 Court is now open. You may be seated.

Case No. 05-40072, Landworks Creations versus United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company.

Counsel, please note your appearance for the record.

MR. MELTZER: Good afternoon, your Honor. Rob Meltzer for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. HERMES: Good afternoon, your Honor. Peter Hermes for the defendant, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. All right. This is a pretrial conference in this case. The principal matters I want to address are whether or not this is a bench or a jury trial, how long the trial is going to be, and to try to set a date for that trial.

Let me start with the first issue. Mr. Meltzer, what's -- is this a jury trial?

MR. MELTZER: Absolutely, your Honor, this is certainly a jury trial. The predominant part of the case is a case under contract. It's a case that involves a substantial issue of material facts for contract performance. There's also a counterclaim, which is a contract claim. Under the Sixth Amendment, we have a right to a jury trial, and we have asked

for a jury trial.

THE COURT: Mr. Hermes.

MR. HERMES: Your Honor, the plaintiff's claim under Chapter 149, Section 29 is by definition a statutory creation and stated to be under the statute an equity claim. The Chapter 93A claim, similarly, is a creature of statute in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and subject to trial by the court. I think I'll leave it at that, your Honor.

MR. MELTZER: Your Honor, I disagree with that position. If I may, your Honor. If equitable is a statutory remedy to the extent of payment under the bond is an equitable remedy. The issues of contract in a counterclaim are similarly a standard Massachusetts contract claim. A ratification agreement between the parties is a construction contract, performances of services and goods, and it must be done by a jury. We've asked for a jury.

THE COURT: Mr. Hermes, let me make sure I understand your point. Count 1 is labeled breach of contract, Landworks versus USF and G.

And it's vague, to say the least, but why do you say that's not a jury, a breach of contract claim?

MR. HERMES: Your Honor, quite frankly, I read that to be a claim for contract in that instance being the bond rather than something else. It is true that there is a ratif -- what I'll call a ratification agreement between Landworks and USF

and G that was executed at some point in time, but I believe the contract at issue here is the following contract between Jackson Construction and Landworks.

THE COURT: Well, it says here --

MR. HERMES: And they raise the right of a bond on there. If -- if the court reads it as asserting a claim under that ratification agreement then Mr. Meltzer is -- well, my argument with respect to the statutory remedy doesn't apply.

MR. MELTZER: Your Honor, we don't believe there is a contract between Landworks and Jackson. That's one of the issues here. They've raised it. We dispute that. This is a straight performance bond. It is a construction contract. At that point, the statute provides the mechanism or the remedy and provides for the amounts of the bonds and provides the jurisdiction at which USF and G is performing, that it is a construction contract.

THE COURT: All right. Let me --

MR. HERMES: I'm -- I'm confused by that statement, your Honor. There's a payment bond here that presumably is the subject of the claim. There is no -- as phrased by Mr. Meltzer, there is no contract between USF and G and with Landworks. It is rather a bond claim with respect to a subcontract between Landworks and a certain authority, but the remedy on the bond, which does away with the third party beneficiary status that one did not otherwise have is a

creation of Chapter 149, Section 29.

MR. MELTZER: Your Honor, that confuses the two principles. There are two kinds of bonds. There is a payment bond, and there's a performance bond. The work was completed with a general contractor, and it became insolvent, and the surety is now stepping in to make the payment. That would be a jury waived bond claim.

This is a case where the work was completed after the failure of Standen, not Jackson. A ratification agreement came in under the performance bond, and it became a construction contract with USF and G to complete it at USF and G's direction and expense. Similar with their counterclaim. They are construction contracts, not posttermination of a general contractor payment bond.

THE COURT: All right. I think what I'm going to need to do is --

MR. HERMES: Phrased that way, your Honor, I agree with the characterization by Mr. Meltzer.

THE COURT: Well, I guess I can do two things. We can accept Mr. Meltzer's claim at face value; in other words, if you say that's the claim, we can go forward on that assumption, or I can get further briefing on it. I'm not sure I can decide this on the fly here without benefit of at least some further motion practice from the parties.

What do you think makes sense? I mean we could do

that on a relatively tight timetable and in the meantime set a trial date on the assumption it will be a jury trial. A bench trial, you know, is easier to squeeze in.

Mr. Meltzer.

MR. MELTZER: I guess what confuses me, your Honor, is that's primarily a jury against USF and G, so I'm a little baffled at the argument. I can brief this, but I do believe that it's a matter of constitutional interpretation that especially once the counterclaim is raised, it is no longer a bond issue. It is a construction contract issue. The counterclaim is certainly.

THE COURT: Well, I mean there is no question, you know, under the Constitution, there's a right to a jury trial in, you know, claims arising of law rather than equity, but that kind of begs the question is this a law or an equitable claim.

MR. MELTZER: If my brother wishes to waive the counterclaim, I'm sure that we would waive the jury.

To me, he interposes the counterclaim that it becomes, I think, problematic before it's even considered as jury waived. The counterclaim is what certainly makes it appear as a standard bread and butter, vanilla contract dispute.

THE COURT: Mr. Hermes.

MR. HERMES: I'm not in a position -- your Honor, I can discuss with that my client. I'm not in a position to

waive the counterclaim. I think within short order Mr. Meltzer and I can at least agree on the characterization of the claims and perhaps agree whether the contract-related claims are ones as to which there's a jury.

If -- if what Mr. Meltzer is saying there is not a Chapter 149, Section 29 claim here then I agree at least as to that claim there may be -- there is -- whatever that other claim is is an entitlement to a jury trial. I differ with respect to the Chapter 90A aspect -- 93A aspect of this, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. 93A, obviously, is not a jury trial issue. That part of it is easy, and I wouldn't impanel a jury for that claim alone as an advisory jury.

On the assumption it's a jury trial, how long do you think the case will take to try, Mr. Meltzer?

MR. MELTZER: Are we half days, I believe.

THE COURT: It's 9:00 to 1:00, but it's a real 9:00 to 1:00. My experience is the cases move at the same pace as they do as a so-called full day.

MR. MELTZER: The only concern I have is that it depends if it's streamlined. I suggest that two motions in limine need to be addressed. If both of those are granted, I think it probably would be five days. I said ten in the pretrial that I had provided, but I think that's -- that may be an streamlined.

1 THE COURT: Mr. Hermes.

MR. HERMES: Your Honor, Mr. Meltzer's list of witnesses includes virtually every witness that the defendant would call, except for the defendant's expert, Mr. Byl. So, if Mr. Meltzer thinks that he can put -- I'm not certain whether he is saying his case is five and a half days or the entire case is that, but assuming that certain key fact witnesses, who are listed on his memo are called, the defendant's case would be one -- one day, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let me take a look at the calendar.

All right. This is awfully quick, but I had a case settle, and I have an opening. We were going to impanel on Friday, May 16th, to try the following week. I could certainly work around that, but that's three weeks away.

How do counsel feel about that?

And this is -- it's not the oldest civil case on my docket, but it's -- it's close. It's in the top ten anyway.

MR. HERMES: As it happens, the second half of May is essentially open in my calendar, your Honor, if there's an opening.

THE COURT: Mr. Meltzer, can you be ready by then?

MR. MELTZER: Yeah, I have one hearing on the 22nd. I
have to get that moved. So, the 19th to the 23rd is open as
well, as well as the -- Memorial Day is the 26th?

1 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MELTZER: Then I actually will be available.

THE COURT: All right. I have a trial scheduled to start on the Monday after Memorial Day. What I would like to do is to try to address this at warp speed; first off, whether we're going to have a jury or not, which will obviously affect quite a bit about how fast this thing proceeds; and second, you say you have some significant motions in limine, Mr. Meltzer.

MR. MELTZER: Well, in the pretrials we both submitted, we both have motions in limine on each other's experts. That's would be, you know, what I was raising. We don't think he has the qualifications to testify at the trial in order to qualify him. We believe that excluding him would actually expedite this trial.

THE COURT: Well, it sounds like a Daubert hearing.

Well, let's see, how quickly can we get this done?

Today is Tuesday. Mr. Meltzer, do you think you could get

something on file by Friday? Is that too tight?

MR. MELTZER: That is a little bit tight. The close of business on Friday, I could have the motion filed.

THE COURT: Why don't we do that, and it doesn't have to be perfect. I mean I'll forgive typos and so forth, but I think it makes -- under the circumstances, I've got a pretty full trial calendar for June, July; I'm gone part of August; September and October are ugly; and I would really try to fit

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this in now. I know you were anxious, Mr. Meltzer, to get this
      thing resolved; and at the risk of something less than complete
      perfection on the motion papers, I think I can get the gist of
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      your argument and try to rule.
               Mr. Hermes, how quickly do you think you could
      respond? Is Wednesday the 7th enough time?
               MR. HERMES: Your Honor, if I may, are we speaking of
      motions in limine with respect to experts, Mr. Byl?
               THE COURT: Apparently, yes.
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               MR. HERMES: Yes.
                                  I believe so, your Honor.
               THE COURT: All right. Why don't we do that, and
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      then -- Marty, what is --
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               (The Court conferred with Mr. Castles.)
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               THE COURT: All right. And then are you available at
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      2:15 on May the 8th for a hearing on those motions and pretrial
      matters generally?
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               MR. MELTZER: I'm actually In Worcester Superior on
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      the 8th in the afternoon.
               MR. HERMES: Yes, your Honor.
               THE COURT:
                           Shoot. Are you available, Mr.
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      Meltzer -- this is unorthodox -- but at the end of the day,
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      say, 4:45 or five o'clock on Thursday the 8th?
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               MR. MELTZER: I can do that. I'm in Worcester.
                                                                I can
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      come here afterwards.
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THE COURT: I think that probably makes the most

sense. Okay. Why don't we just say five o'clock on the 8th, and I think those motions need to be any motions in limine concerning the trial, and any motion concerning the jury trial issue, if the parties can't somehow resolve it; and I think that that will need to be our pretrial conference. I'm going to set a later date for the filing of voir dire questions, proposed jury instructions, witness lists, exhibits lists and so forth. I'm going to ask you to file all of that by the end of the day on May the 13th, that is by five -- by five o'clock. But you ought to be prepared to talk about anything that's controversial or that you -- for example, if you have a -- if it is a jury trial, and you have an unusual voir dire question, you ought to be prepared to raise it on the 8th.

Now, I'm sorry to being putting you all on such a tight timetable. I just think this makes more sense than any other alternatives, which are not pretty.

MR. HERMES: From -- from my perspective, not my client, your Honor, this is the best of times given the schedule for the succeeding time periods, so I have no objection to it.

MR. MELTZER: I agree.

THE COURT: And again, don't worry about, you know, filing things that might have a typo in it, which I know tends to take 50 percent of -- 90 percent of the time writing something is, you know, perfecting it, but --

MR. HERMES: Your Honor, do I take it that if the defendant has a motion in limine that also should be served by the close of business on this Friday?

THE COURT: Yes, I think -- I think it's going to have to.

MR. HERMES: I mean the one -- the one motion I have in mind with respect to the jury trial is the robust nature of the description of the case. I'm not sure where Mr. Meltzer stops with respect to what might be contract jury and what begins 93A, but I have some definite views with respect to that that I would like the court to consider.

THE COURT: Okay. You can raise that by a motion in limine.

Again, assuming it's a jury trial, I will hear the 93 issues ordinarily at the same time. If there is some reason to have a portion of the trial kept from the jury, that is something that's relevant only to the 93A and might be additional context, I will consider that, but they're ordinarily, you know, intertwined.

MR. HERMES: To the extent Mr. Meltzer speaks of other projects, your Honor, a whole project or litigation between a man by the name of Bordieri, who was president of Jackson Construction, it's that sort of thing that Mr. Meltzer may believe is appropriate to 93A, but I don't believe is appropriate to the contract issues. It's that sort of thing,

which I am making reference to.

MR. MELTZER: The problem is, your Honor, is where they do get intertwined. The problem we have is that one of the primary issues is whether or not USF and G responded not only according to industry standard in terms of defining contract terms, but whether or not they added policy and procedure.

In the Hull case that he just mentioned, it was a case that was filed during the same exact time frame. It was a case that ratification was done after litigation was filed. They've claimed that the mere act of filing the lawsuit constitutes abandonment and the right to terminate the contract. By their own policy, that's not the case. So they have to come in sort of fighting abandonment and the usual process of procedure in these kind of cases.

THE COURT: I'm not going to decide the question now. I'll let the motion be filed. I will say, as a general proposition, if there is something that is relevant to 93A or 176B, or whatever, however it's framed, that would ordinarily and appropriately be heard only by the court, as opposed to a jury, assuming there is a jury on the contract claim. We can have that hearing. That doesn't need to be tied to this schedule. In other words, suppose I agree with Mr. Meltzer that it's relevant, but I also agree that it's not relevant to the contract claims, we can get that testimony in as best we

can in an afternoon or some other time. We can deal with that later, if need be. Okay. But I'll wait for the motion and see what the issues are first off.

All right. Let's handle it that way then: Motions by the 2nd; responses by the 7th; a hearing at five o'clock on the 8th; other pretrial filings due Tuesday the 13th; and I'm going to need to resolve this jury or bench trial issue by the 8th. If the parties want to file anything by that, they're welcome to. And we will, assuming it is a jury, we'll impanel the morning of Friday, May the 16th; and in all likelihood, just for planning purposes, what we will do is we will impanel. We may possibly have opening statements, but we would not have testimony. So the first witness would be called on the 19th. Okay.

MR. MELTZER: Your Honor, if may ask one question.
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MELTZER: If we could have a trial order issued today pointing out that trial date. I have one date I have to move up my schedule for that week. They are going to want to see an order of the trial being called on the 18th. If you could have something that like that that would be helpful for me.

THE COURT: Mr. Castles is going do an electronic order. That's an order of the court, an electronic entry. If that's not good enough let me know, and I'll issue something

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      else.
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               MR. MELTZER: That would be fine.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Meltzer?
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               MR. MELTZER: That should do it, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Hermes.
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               MR. HERMES: No, sir.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And I appreciate your
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      flexibility and willingness to do it in the time tight.
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               All right. We'll stand in recess.
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               (At 3:38 p.m., court was adjourned.)
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CERTIFICATE

I, Marianne Kusa-Ryll, RDR, CRR, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript, consisting of 16 pages inclusive, is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes in Case No. 05cv40072, Landworks Creations, LLC versus United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, before

F. Dennis Saylor, IV, on April 29, 2008, to the best of my

skill, knowledge, and ability.

/s/ Marianne Kusa-Ryll

Marianne Kusa-Ryll, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter